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I. INTRODUCTION
A majority of courts have determined that all contracts impose on
the parties to the contract an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in their actions with each other.1 This implied covenant prohib-
its a contracting party from injuring another party's right to receive the
benefits of the agreement.2 Breach of this implied covenant usually cre-
* Throughout the Special Project, this piece is cited as Special Project Note, "Bad Faith
Breach".
1. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94
HARv. L. REV. 369, 404 app. (1980) (citing cases in jurisdictions that have developed this rule). For
a discussion of implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, see Recent Development, Implied
Covenants of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: Loose Cannons of Liability for Financial Institu-
tions?, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1197 (1987).
2. See Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 87, 188 N.E. 163, 167 (1933),
noted in Burton, supra note 1, at 400 app.; see also Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566,
577, 510 P.2d 1032, 1040, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 484 (1973).
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ates a cause of action based on contract rights. Moreover, California
courts maintain that breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing creates a tort action as well. The California courts initially
limited these tort actions to claims against insurance companies.4 Other
states have followed California in allowing tort recovery for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in insurance con-
tracts.5 The imposition of tort liability in contract suits has allowed
courts to award the injured party all damages proximately caused by
breach of the contract, as well as punitive damages.'
Recently, California courts expanded bad faith breach outside of
the insurance context and into the commercial arena.7 Financial institu-
tions have been significantly affected by this expansion.8 Since the in-
3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS] (stating that "every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing
in its performance and its enforcement"); see also Masonite Corp. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 65
Cal. App. 3d 1, 9, 135 Cal. Rptr. 170, 175 (1976).
4. See, e.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 620 P.2d 141, 169 Cal. Rptr.
691 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980) (holding that Mutual of Omaha's failure to properly
investigate insured's claim by having its own physician examine insured and by failing to consult
with insured's own physician and surgeon amounted to a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing contained in the disability policy); Gruenberg, 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032,
108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (holding that Aetna's refusal to compensate insured without cause for loss cov-
ered by the insurance policy could give rise to a tort action for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13 (1967) (holding that an insurance company breaches the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing when it refuses to accept a reasonable settlement, thereby depriving the insured of the
policy's benefits); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958) (hold-
ing that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing imposes an unexpressed duty on an
insurance company to accept a reasonable settlement with a third party).
5. See Kornblum, Recent Cases Interpreting the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing, 30 DEF. L.J. 411, 431 n.50 (1981). The other state courts that have followed California in
allowing tort recovery for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are Ari-
zona, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. Id. Several federal district courts with
diversity jurisdiction have interpreted state law as imposing the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing on parties to an insurance contract. These courts include the federal district
courts in Vermont, South Carolina, and Florida. Id.
Breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has been referred to under a
variety of labels. These labels include the "insurer's mistaken judgment," the "new tort of out-
rage," the "tort of bad faith," "tortious interference with a protected property interest," and "bad
faith breach." This Note will refer to the tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing as "bad faith breach."
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 917 (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF TORTS]
(stating that a person who "harms the person or property of another is subject to liability for the
consequences of the harm"). These damages include compensation for emotional distress, id. §
905(b), and compensation for punitive damages if the defendant's conduct is "outrageous" because
of "evil motive" or "reckless indifference to the rights of others," id. § 908(2).
7. See, e.g., Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d
1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984); see also infra notes 71-85 and accompanying text.
8. The imposition of bad faith breach on financial institutions has caused them to become
much more cautious in their dealings with clients. A financial institution may have to place its
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troduction of bad faith breach into the banking industry, borrowers are
suing lenders with increasing frequency.9 These borrowers frequently
prevail on the merits and obtain large judgments against the financial
institutions.10
This Note, in Part II, examines the good faith doctrine and in
Parts II and III traces the development of bad faith breach into the
commercial realm. Special emphasis is placed on the introduction of
bad faith breach into the banking area. Part III also reviews a case re-
cently reversed by the California Court of Appeals because of the
court's determination that the borrower's bad faith breach cause of ac-
tion against the financial institution was factually unsupported. Finally,
in Part IV, this Note examines the possibility of a financial institution
using Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) sections 2-609 and 2-610 dur-
ing times of insecurity to demand payment from its client without im-
posing liability on itself.
II. HISTORY OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALING
Traditionally, lender liability claims against financial institutions
were governed by the Bankruptcy Code,"I federal securities laws, 12 tax
client's needs in front of its own, thereby subjecting itself to economic loss in order to avoid a suit
by its client for bad faith breach. Moreover, the judgments against financial institutions for bad
faith breach have been extremely large, and an increasing number of states are imposing this tort
action on financial institutions.
9. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, EMERGING THEORIES OF LENDER LIABILITY (H.
Chaitman ed. 1985); Granoff, Emerging Theories of Lender Liability: Flawed Applications of Old
Concepts, 104 BANKING L.J. 492 (1987).
10. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (affirming jury
award of $7.5 million); State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)
(affirming jury award of $18.5 million).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (1982) (providing that "under principles of equitable subordination,
[a court may] subordinate for purposes of distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part
of another allowed claim"). Bankruptcy Code § 547(b) allows a court to require a financial institu-
tion to return property received in a preferential transfer. Id. § 547(b).
12. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(o), 78t(a) (1982). A court may hold a bank liable as being a "control-
ling person" under the Securities Act of 1933 § 15, id. § 77(o), and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 20(a), id. § 78t(a). Section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 states that:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who, pursuant to
or in connection with an agreement or understanding with one or more other persons by or
through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any person liable under sections 11 or
12 of this title, shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such
controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the control-
ling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts
by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist.
Id. § 77(o). Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 declares:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of this
chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with
and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled
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and wage laws,13 and the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO). 4 In addition, potential common-law theories that could be
asserted included fraud, 6  duress, 16 breach of fiduciary duty,17 and in-
person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or
indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.
Id. § 78t(a).
13. See I.R.C. § 3505(a) (1982). A financial institution who is not an employer but who fi-
nances the payroll of its debtor can be liable under the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) for failing
to collect and remit wage withholding taxes. Section 3505(a) of the I.R.C. declares:
[I]f a lender . . . who is not an employer . . .pays wages directly to such an employee or
group of employees . . . such lender. . . shall be liable in his own person and estate to the
United States in a sum equal to the taxes (together with interest) required to be deducted
and withheld from such wages by such employer.
Id.
14. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982). A financial institution may be liable if it engages in activi-
ties prohibited by the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Id. Section 1962(a)
declares:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indi-
rectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in
which such person has participated as a principal . . . to use or invest, directly or indirectly,
any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or
the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
Id. § 1962(a).
15. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 6, § 525. A person who fraudulently makes a
misrepresentation of fact for the purpose of inducing another person to act is liable for injuries
caused to the relying person. Id. The California Supreme Court held a financial institution liable
for fraud in Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of Am., 38 Cal. 3d 892, 701 P.2d 826, 215 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1985).
In Sanchez-Corea, the bank represented that it would finance the debtor in return for an assign-
ment of all the debtor's accounts receivable. Id. at 909, 701 P.2d at 838, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 691. At
the time of this representation, Bank of America had determined that it would not finance the
debtor. Id. Bank of America, after the accounts receivable assignment, denied the debtor's long-
term loan application. Id. The jury awarded the debtor $1 million in punitive damages and the
California Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 910, 701 P.2d at 839, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 692; see also
Farah, 678 S.W.2d 661 (jury verdict of $18.5 million, based in part on damages for fraud, was
affirmed by the court of appeals with a remittitur of $300,105); cf. Stirling v. Chemical Bank, 382
F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 516 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1975) (shareholder's suit alleging fraud
in connection with purchase and sale of securities dismissed for failure to state a claim on which
relief could be granted). For further discussion, see Special Project Note, Lender Liability, supra,
at notes 152-60 and accompanying text.
16. See 13 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1602 (3d ed. 1970). Duress
occurs when one person unlawfully threatens another person, causing that other person to do
something he otherwise would not do. Id. For cases holding a financial institution liable under
duress, see Spillers v. Five Points Guaranty Bank, 335 So. 2d 851, 852 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
(holding a lender may be liable for duress if it threatens to enforce legal rights that are nonexis-
tent); and Farah, 678 S.W.2d 661 (jury verdict of $18.5 million based in part on damages for
duress). See also Special Project Note, Lender Liability, supra, at notes 161-71 and accompanying
text.
17. See, e.g., First Bank of WaKeeney v. Moden, 235 Kan. 260, 262, 681 P.2d 11, 13 (1984).
Banks have been held to the standards of a fiduciary in many instances. In determining whether a
fiduciary relationship exists, courts look for:
[T]he acting of one person for another; the having and the exercising of influence over one
person by another; the reposing of confidence by one person in another; the dominance of one
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terference.18 More recently, however, courts have held lenders liable
under the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
theory.19
Original contract theory allowed a party either to perform its con-
tractual obligation or to pay compensatory damages.20 If the damaged
person by another; the inequality of the parties; and the dependence of one person upon
another. In addition, courts have considered weakness of age, mental strength, business intel-
ligence, knowledge of the facts involved or other conditions giving to one an advantage over
the other.
Id. Many courts have held a lender liable for breaching its fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Stanghellini
Ranch, Inc. v. Bank of Am., Ne. 35448, No. 3 Civ. C003244 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1987)
(holding Bank of America liable to plaintiffs for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress because it seized almost one million dollars from plaintiffs' pass-
book accounts and began foreclosure proceedings on their farm and homes after it persuaded
plaintiffs to expand their business by signing personal guarantees for loans); Hooper v. Barnett
Bank, 474 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that under certain circumstances, a
financial institution has a fiduciary duty to disclose the financial condition of its customers); First
Nat'l Bank v. Brown, 181 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1970) (holding that First National Bank's withholding
of facts to plaintiff when transacting a loan to buy property which would have caused plaintiff not
to buy the property was a breach of First National Bank's fiduciary duty that amounted to fraud);
Smith v. Saginaw Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 94 Mich. App. 263, 288 N.W.2d 613 (1979) (holding Saginaw
Savings & Loan liable for breach of its fiduciary obligation when it abused its relationship with
plaintiff by maintaining that a builder was reliable when it knew the builder was having financial
difficulties, by assuring that funds from plaintiff's loan would be available for construction, and by
asserting that it would not give the builder any funds from the loan unless work was done by the
builder, when the opposite proved to be true); see also Special Project Note, Lender Liability,
supra, at notes 63-134 and accompanying text.
18. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 6, § 766. Interference occurs when one party
improperly and intentionally interferes with the performance of a contract by causing one of the
contracting parties not to perform under the contract. Id. For cases holding a financial institution
liable for interference, see Melamed v. Lake County Nat'l Bank, 727 F.2d 1399 (6th Cir. 1984) (in a
suit by the trustee in a bankruptcy case, the court held the financial institution liable for interfer-
ing with debtor's business because it replaced the debtor's accountant with one selected by the
bank; it retained final approval over all payments made by the debtor; and it forced the debtor's
president to take a fifty percent pay cut); and Farah, 678 S.W.2d 661 (jury verdict of $18.5 million
based in part on damages for interference); see also Special Project Note, Lender Liability, supra,
at notes 172-81 and accompanying text.
19. See Sokolsky, Of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: A Tort is Expanded to the Banks, Nat'l
L.J., Oct. 24, 1988, at 22. Some factors courts have used in determining whether a financial institu-
tion has breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are as follows:
The degree of dependence and trust that the borrower has upon the bank; [t]he existence of a
relationship of trust and confidence between a bank and the borrower; [w]hether the bank
stands to benefit by virtue of the borrower's default; [whether] the bank is the only avenue of
financing upon which the borrower may rely, or [w]hether it is highly unlikely that the bor-
rower would get credit elsewhere by virtue of the lender's handling of the loans; [whether]
there is a consistent and uninterrupted course of dealing between the parties over an ex-
tended period of time; [w]hether the borrower anticipated and relied upon receiving a specific
line of credit;. . . (with regard to loan acceleration), whether a reasonable person would have
greatly accelerated the debt under the circumstances; whether the borrower acted in good
faith; [and m]ost important, whether the borrower was given adequate time to seek alterna-
tive financing.
Id.
20. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, supra note 3, §§ 344-385 (remedies); see also id. intro-
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party could not be adequately remedied with compensatory damages, a
court could award specific performance.21 Courts were not concerned
with the motive behind the breach.22 In addition, punitive damages
were not allowed because the purpose of compensation was not to pun-
ish the breaching party, but rather to put the damaged party in as good
a position as he would have been if the contract had been performed. 3
A. The Uniform Commercial Code and the Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Original contract theories have been modified by the judicial impo-
sition of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into every
contract.2 4 This implied covenant prohibits parties to the contract from
doing anything that would deprive the other party of the benefits of the
bargain. 5 U.C.C. section 1-20316 states that "[e]very contract or duty
within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance
or enforcement. 2 7 U.C.C. section 1-201(19)"s defines good faith as
"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned."2 Article 2
expands a merchant's obligation of good faith to include not only hon-
esty in fact, but also "the observance of reasonable commercial stan-
dards of fair dealing in the trade."30 Additionally, U.C.C. section 1-
102(3) 3' will not allow parties to waive the good faith requirement, but
ductory note, at 100. The Restatement indicates that a party may find himself at an economic
advantage to breach the contract "if he will still have a net gain after he has fully compensated the
injured party for the resulting loss." Id.
21. See id.; G. GILMORE, THE DEATH op CoNTRAcT 14-15 (1974).
22. See RESTATEMENT OF CoNRAcTs, supra note 3, §§ 344-385 (remedies); see also id. intro-
ductory note, at 100 (stating that "'willful breaches'" have not been distinguished from other
breaches).
23. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 355 comment a (stating that "[t]he
purpose of awarding contract damages is to compensate the injured party ... [flor this reason,
courts in contract cases do not award damages to punish the party in breach or to serve as an
example to others").
24. See generally Burton, supra note 1; Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commer-
cial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHL L. REv. 666 (1963); Sum-
mers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L.
REV. 810 (1982). Recent Development, supra note 1, at 1202.
25. Burton, supra note 1, at 379-80.
26. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1987).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 1-201(19).
29. Id.
30. Id. § 2-103(1)(b). A merchant is defined as "a person who deals in goods of the kind or
otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices
or goods involved in the transaction." Id. § 2-104(1). However, many courts apply only the U.C.C.
§ 1-201(19) general definition of good faith to financial institutions instead of the more stringent
definition of U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b). See, e.g., Van Bibber v. Norris, 419 N.E.2d 115, 122 (Ind. 1981)
(concluding that financial institution is not subject to the "merchant" definition of good faith).
31. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1987).
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will allow them to determine reasonable standards by which good faith
will be measured. " Finally, section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts"3 "imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair
dealing in its performance and its enforcement.
'34
Commentators differ in their interpretation of these good faith re-
quirements."3 Professor Farnsworth distinguishes good faith on the ba-
sis of good faith purchase and good faith performance.3 6 Good faith
purchase is measured subjectively because it describes a state of mind,
similar to notice.3 7 In contrast, good faith performance does not involve
a state of mind. Rather, good faith performance is measured objectively
through community standards of "decency, fairness, or
reasonableness."3 8
Professor Summers does not identify criteria that courts should use
in deciding whether an individual acted in good faith.39 Rather, he feels
good faith can be defined as being the opposite of what a court deter-
mines a party has done in bad faith.40 In other words, Summers sug-
gests that good faith must be measured by a purely objective
standard. 1
Unlike Farnsworth or Summers, Professor Burton uses a cost per-
spective analysis in his definition of good faith.42 In his analysis, a party
acts in bad faith when he uses discretion to "recapture opportunities
32. Id. Additionally, U.C.C. § 1-208 addresses "insecurity clauses," and allows "at will" accel-
eration of payment or performance only if the party in good faith believes himself insecure. Id. § 1-
208.
33. RESTATEMENT OF CoNrRAcTs, supra note 3, § 205.
34. Id.
35. For a discussion of the differing approaches of commentators, see Recent Development,
supra note 1, at 1202.
36. Farnsworth, supra note 24, at 667-71.
37. Id. at 668. Professor Farnsworth's example of good faith purchase clearly illustrates his
definition: "Whether the purchaser of goods takes good title from a seller whose own title is voida-
ble because of fraud depends, under the [U.C.C.], on whether he purchased in good faith." Id.
38. Id. at 668, 672.
39. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195, 201 (1968).
40. Id. at 200. Professor Summers' example of his theory is illustrative:
[A] judge may say: "A public authority must act in good faith in letting bids." And from the
facts or language of the opinion it may appear that the judge is, in effect, saying: "The de-
fendant acted in bad faith because he lets bids only as a pretense to conceal his purpose to
award the contract to a favored bidder." It can then be said that "acting in good faith" here
simply means: letting bids without a preconceived design to award the contract to a favored
bidder.
Id. at 200-01.
41. Id. at 204-05.
42. Burton, supra note 1, at 378. Professor Burton notes that a party enters into a contract
"when it believes that no greater benefit can be derived by expending elsewhere the resources
required for the contract performance." Id. at 377. However, events occurring after formation of
the contract may prove this to be false. Id.
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forgone upon entering the contract."4 Thus, a party breaches a con-
tract in bad faith when he uses his discretion and decides not to per-
form the contract-an act well beyond the scope of the risks assumed
by the party claiming the breach."
Because the good faith standard is so broad and subject to varying
definitions, courts, like commentators, often have disagreed on its ap-
plication to specific fact patterns.45 Courts initially used the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to supply missing terms to a
contract.46 In this way, courts were able to protect a party in an inferior
bargaining position.47 Later, courts used the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing to imply a reasonableness standard to express
contract terms that violated the court's view of an equitable arrange-
ment.48 This development suggested that courts increasingly were con-
cerned with the reasons for a contract breach.49 In light of this change
in focus, courts began to order large judgments against parties who had
breached contracts.50
The courts' increasing concern with the underlying causes of con-
tract breach gave rise to an action in tort for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or "bad faith breach."'5' Similar
to the analysis in contract actions, courts focused on whether the
breaching party's actions injured the other party's right to receive the
benefits of the agreement.2 Courts determined that this obligation to
43. Id. at 378. Professor Burton uses an example of a corn buyer who fails to perform a
contract for future delivery because the market price for corn has fallen subsequent to contract
formation. Id. at 377. The buyer may choose to "recapture the opportunity of buying on the spot
market or on a changed futures market" and thereby breach the contract. Id. Obviously, breach of
this contract would be to the buyer's economic advantage. His recapture of foregone opportunities,
however, would necessarily hurt the seller. This is true in every breach of contract. Id. at 387.
44. Id. at 386.
45. See generally Burton, supra note 1; Farnsworth, supra note 24; Summers, supra note 39.
46. See, e.g., Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214, 164 N.Y.S. 576
(1917) (interjecting into an exclusive sales contract the implied promise that seller was to use
reasonable efforts to make a profit).
47. See, e.g., Bak-A-Lum Corp. of Am. v. Alcoa Bldg. Prods., 69 N.J. 123, 351 A.2d 349
(1976) (exclusive distributorship only terminable after a reasonable period of time and on reasona-
ble notice).
48. See, e.g., Sylvan Crest Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 150 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1945)
(interjecting good faith into the contract term allowing the United States to cancel its require-
ments contract at any time; the court determined that "any time" must be a reasonable time).
49. See, e.g., Art Hill Ford, Inc. v. Callender, 423 N.E.2d 601, 602 (Ind. 1981) (holding that if
"it can be shown that the public interest will be served by the deterrent effect of punitive dam-
ages," a court should award them "whenever the elements of fraud, malice, gross negligence or
oppression mingle").
50. Id.
51. See discussion supra note 5.
52. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 818-19, 620 P.2d 141, 145, 169 Cal.
Rptr. 691, 695 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980).
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act in good faith in discharging contractual responsibilities did not arise
out of the terms of the contract, but rather was imposed on the con-
tracting parties by law.53
By allowing tort recovery for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, courts have been able to award greater
damages than those allowable under traditional contract law.5 4 This ex-
panded recovery includes damages for all proximately caused injuries,
including injuries arising from emotional distress,55 as well as punitive
damages. 56 Moreover, courts are grafting ethical standards onto con-
tract law. Instead of being neutral towards breach of contract, courts
now are concerned with the reason for the breach. In addition, courts
are attempting to deter unethical conduct by imposing large judgments
against the breaching party.
B. Bad Faith in Insurance Contracts
Bad faith breach first was recognized in actions against insurance
companies.57 In Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Co.58 the
California Supreme Court applied the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing and imposed an unexpressed duty on Traders to accept
a reasonable settlement with a third party.5 9 Currently, an insurer can
be held liable for bad faith breach if it fails to give at least as much
consideration to the insured's interests as it does to its own interest
when evaluating a settlement offer. 60
The rationale for applying the bad faith breach doctrine to insur-
ance contracts centered on the special nature of insurance contracts.
Courts recognized that insurance contracts differed significantly from
ordinary commercial contracts. 1 One notable difference was the reason
53. See id. at 818, 620 P.2d at 145, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
54. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 6, § 908(2).
55. Id. § 905(b); see also Goldberg, Emotional Distress Damages and Breach of Contract: A
New Approach, 20 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 57, 61-67, 98-103 (1986).
56. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
57. For a discussion of the extension of the tort of bad faith breach to insurance and other
contracts, see generally Recent Development, supra note 1, at 1209-15.
58. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
59. Id. at 659-60, 328 P.2d at 201; see also Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 430, 426
P.2d 173, 176-77, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16-17 (1967).
60. See, e.g., Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 818, 620 P.2d at 145, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 695. The Egan court
held that Mutual of Omaha's failure to properly investigate insured's claim by having its own
physician examine insured and by failing to consult with insured's own physician and surgeon
amounted to a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in the
disability policy. The court also held that the "governing standard" imposed on an insurer is
"whether a prudent insurer would have accepted the settlement offer if it alone were to be liable
for the entire judgment." Id.
61. See id.; see also infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
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an insured enters into the insurance contract. Rather than striving for a
"commercial advantage," an insured seeks to obtain peace of mind and
security from the insurance contract.62 Additionally, courts noted the
inequality of bargaining power between the insurer and insured, and
declared insurance agreements to be adhesion contracts." Furthermore,
courts determined that the insurer's service was "quasi-public in na-
ture" and that insurers "h[e]ld themselves out as fiduciaries."'6 By im-
posing on insurers the additional liability allowed under the bad faith
breach doctrine,6 5 courts can force insurers, acting as fiduciaries, to use
greater care in transactions with insureds.
C. Bad Faith Breach in Employment Contracts
California courts initially refused to expand bad faith breach into
the commercial realm.6 In Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,67 how-
ever, the California Supreme Court declared that breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment contracts could
be based in tort as well as in contract law." Other California courts also
62. See Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 819, 620 P.2d at 145, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
63. See id. at 820, 620 P.2d at 146, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
64. Id.
65. An insurer's bad faith breach of contract can result in damages for all injuries proxi-
mately caused by the breach, including damages for emotional distress, Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins.
Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 579-80, 510 P.2d 1032, 1040-42, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 488-90 (1973), and attorney
fees, Brandt v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 813, 817, 693 P.2d 796, 798, 210 Cal. Rptr. 211, 213
(1985). If the insurer acts with malice, oppression, or fraud, a court may award punitive damages.
Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 819, 620 P.2d at 146, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
66. See Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Marina View Heights Dev. Co., 66 Cal. App. 3d
101, 135 Cal. Rptr. 802 (1977). The Glendale court, while upholding an award of punitive damages
based on promissory fraud, declared that "[w]hile a breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing may give rise to a cause of action sounding in tort in the insurance field .... we
are not aware of any appellate court case, and none has been cited, extending that principle to
other contractual relationships." Id. at 135 n.8, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 822 n.8 (citations omitted).
In Sawyer v. Bank of America, 83 Cal. App. 3d 135, 145 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1978), the defendant
bank refused to pay the plaintiff for fire damage to his truck. The financial institution had failed
to maintain insurance on the plaintiff's truck which was in violation of the terms of an oral agree-
ment. Although the plaintiff claimed that the financial institution's actions caused him emotional
distress, the California Court of Appeals, First District, held that the financial institution was not
liable for a bad faith breach action extraneous to the contract:
[I]t is not a tort for a contractual obligor to dispute his liability under the contract. Rather,
the tort of breaching an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing consists [of] bad faith
action, extraneous to the contract, with the motive intentionally to frustrate the obligee's
enjoyment of contract rights.
Id. at 139, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
67. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980). The California Supreme Court
in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988), recently
disapproved of allowing a tort cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in employment contracts unless the employee has been discharged by the employer
because of his unwillingness to participate in unlawful conduct.
68. Id. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant committed a bad faith breach of his employ-
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have applied the bad faith breach doctrine to certain employment con-
tracts. 9 Yet, other courts found a tort cause of action based on implied-
in-fact promises.7 0 Thus, before the landmark case of Seaman's Direct
Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 71 bad faith breach was limited
to insurance contracts and to certain employment contracts.
D. Extension of Bad Faith Breach to Financial Institutions
In Seaman's Standard Oil allegedly refused to recognize the sales
contract it had with Seaman's. Standard's obligation under the contract
was to supply oil to Seaman's. Standard also allegedly tried to interfere
with Seaman's attempts to obtain authorization from the government
so that Seaman's could receive the supply of oil that it needed from
Standard.
72
In 1971 Seaman's sought to lease space in a new marina in Eureka,
California, in order to operate a marine fuel distributorship. 73 Because
Eureka demanded written evidence of a binding oil supply contract
before it would lease to Seaman's, Seaman's negotiated with Standard
in order to obtain a supply agreement.7 4 In 1972, after agreeing on all
major issues, Seaman's presented a letter to Eureka as evidence of a
ment contract by wrongfully discharging him from his job of 15 years because of his refusal to
participate in the company's illegal plan to fix gasoline prices. Id. at 169, 610 P.2d at 1330-31, 164
Cal. Rptr. at 849. The court determined this to be a cause of action under California's wrongful
discharge doctrine. Id. at 179, 610 P.2d at 1336-37, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846. Since this complaint fell
within this doctrine, the court did not have to determine whether a cause of action for bad faith
breach applied to employment contracts. Id. at 179 n.12, 610 P.2d at 1337 n.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. at
846 n.12. However, the court stated that generally, a breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in employment contracts sounds in tort and in contract:
[W]e believe it is unnecessary to determine whether a tort recovery would additionally be
available... on the theory that Arco's discharge constituted a breach of the implied-at-law
covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in every contract. We do note in this regard,
however, that authorities in other jurisdictions have on occasion found an employer's dis-
charge of an at-will employee violative of the employer's "good faith and fair dealing" obliga-
tions, . .. and past California cases have held that a breach of this implied-at-law covenant
sounds in tort as well as contract.
Id. (citations omitted).
69. See, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980)
(holding that defendant's termination of an oral employment contract after eighteen years of satis-
factory performance without legal cause breached the implied-at-law covenant of good faith and
fair dealing).
70. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981)
(holding that employer discharging employee after 32 years of service violated the implied promise
that it would not act arbitrarily in dealing with the employee).
71. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984); see Recent Development, supra
note 1, at 1212-13.
72. Id. at 761-62, 686 P.2d at 1161-62, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 357-58.
73. Id. at 759, 686 P.2d at 1160, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
74. Id. at 759-60, 686 P.2d at 1160, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
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binding contract. Consequently, the city granted the lease.7
One year later the Arab oil embargo was implemented and Stan-
dard informed Seaman's that because of the new federal fuel allocation
program Standard would not supply Seaman's with oil pursuant to the
prior contract between the parties.76 In response to Seaman's numerous
requests and appeals, the Federal Energy Office told Seaman's that it
would issue a supply order only if Seaman's could establish that it had
a valid supply contract with Standard. 7 When asked to stipulate the
existence of the contract, Standard refused, knowing that Seaman's
could not afford a trial to prove the existence of the contract.7 8 Because
Seaman's no longer had an oil supply contract, it was forced out of bus-
iness. 79 Seaman's then brought suit against Standard, 0 alleging that
Standard tortiously breached the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. 1 The jury held in favor of Seaman's.2
On appeal, the California Supreme Court determined that an im-
plied-at-law duty of good faith and fair dealing might interfere with
freedom to contract and, thus, refused to extend the application of bad
faith breach to commercial contracts.8 " The court recognized the "spe-
cial relationship" involved in insurance contracts, including elements of
public interest, adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility, and determined
that only in these types of relationships, along with certain employment
relationships, could a court apply the bad faith breach doctrine.8 The
majority, however, did create a separate tort of bad faith denial of a
contract.
85
75. Id. at 760, 686 P.2d at 1161, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
76. Id. at 760-61, 686 P.2d at 1161, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
77. Id. at 761, 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
78. Id. at 761-62, 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 762, 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
81. Id. The court did not elaborate on Seaman's theory under which it was alleging bad faith
breach because it held Standard liable for bad faith breach of contract under its own theory. Id. at
768-69, 686 P.2d at 1166-67, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63; see also infra note 85 and accompanying
text.
82. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 762, 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
83. Id. at 769, 686 P.2d at 1166-67, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362-66.
84. Id. at 768-69 & n.6, 686 P.2d at 1166 & n.6, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362 & n.6.
85. Id. at 769-70, 686 P.2d at 1166-67, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63. The court determined that "a
party may incur tort remedies when, in addition to breaching the contract, it seeks to shield itself
from liability by denying, in bad faith and without probable cause, that the contract exists." Id. at
769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363. The court remanded the case for a new trial because
the jury was not instructed that Standard must have denied the existence of the contract in bad
faith in order to be liable to Seaman's for tortious breach of the contract. Id. at 744, 686 P.2d at
1170, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
For a thorough discussion of Seaman's, see Comment, Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v.
Standard Oil Co.: Tortious Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in a Nonin-
surance Commercial Contract Case, 71 IOWA L. REv. 893 (1986); and Comment, Sailing the Un-
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A "Seaman's" cause of action can arise in lender liability litigation.
For example, in 999 v. C.I.T. Corp.,"8 999, the borrower, sought to ob-
tain a loan from C.I.T. 999 gave C.I.T. a deposit of 25,000 dollars in
accordance with a handwritten letter containing the terms of the "pro-
posed financing. ' s7 The letter did not mention any prepayment penalty.
Several weeks later, however, C.I.T. informed 999 that it had added a
25,000 dollar per month prepayment penalty.88 999 refused to accept
the new term and sought alternative financing. 999, however, was una-
ble to obtain alternative financing before it incurred a loss on one of its
investments.8 9 The Ninth Circuit held C.I.T. liable on contract princi-
ples, but declared that a Seaman's cause of action could apply in this
context.90
The California Court of Appeals applied the Seaman's cause of ac-
tion in Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank.9 The court
held that United California Bank had breached the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing by asserting a defense that it knew to be
without merit in an effort to avoid bearing the loss resulting from its
own negligence.9 2 The jury awarded the plaintiff 124,000 dollars in dam-
ages, including damages for emotional distress and negligent payment,
as well as punitive damages for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.
9 3
The California Supreme Court, on appeal, affirmed the judgments
for negligent payment and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
charted Seas of Bad Faith: Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 69 MINN. L.
REV. 1161 (1985).
86. 776 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1985). Although the company 999 was in serious financial trouble,
the transaction gave 999 an opportunity to operate a "captive buyer" that would manufacture
products from raw materials processed by another 999 subsidiary. Id. at 868. Because the manufac-
turing company was nearly insolvent, however, its creditors demanded that 999 guaranty the com-
pany's debts in return for the creditors promise to continue supplying the company with necessary
operating materials. Id.
87. Id. at 868. The $25,000 was apparently prepayment for certain costs and expenses.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 870. Several recent cases have rejected bad faith breach as it applies to financial
institutions. See, e.g., Betterton v. First Interstate Bank, 800 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that
since Arizona courts had not extended bad faith breach from insurance contracts to employment
contracts, the tort should not be extended to lending contracts; thus, a borrower is limited to
contractual remedies only); Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank & Trust Co., 713 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1986) (holding that good faith obligations are contractual and do not give rise to a cause of
action sounding in tort).
91. 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985); see Recent Development, supra note 1,
at 1219-20.
92. Id. at 514, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 553. The client brought suit after the bank negligently paid
two checks containing unauthorized signatures and then refused to recredit the account. Id.
93. Id. at 513-14, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
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dealing, but reversed the judgment for infliction of emotional distress.9 4
In its analysis, the court declared that breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing could be applied outside of insurance contracts.
The court also noted that Seaman's did not preclude the application of
this doctrine to ordinary commercial contracts. 5 The court justified its
position of allowing United California Bank to be held liable for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by noting the
similarities between the contract of an insurance company and its in-
sured and that of a financial institution and its client.9 The court de-
termined that at least a quasi-fiduciary relationship exists between the
financial institution and its client."' Thus, the court declared that the
financial institution's assertion of a nonmeritorious defense constituted
a bad faith breach.
After Commercial Cotton, it appeared that the California courts
only would allow recovery for bad faith breach by a financial institution
if a "special relationship" existed between the two parties, similar to
the relationship found to exist between an insurer and its insured.
III. FURTHER EXTENSION OF BAD FAITH BREACH INTO COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS: No SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP NEEDED
A. K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.
In K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co." the Sixth Circuit held that a
financial institution's acceleration of its client's indebtedness consti-
tuted a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
K.M.C. operated its business on a 3.5 million dollar line of credit from
Irving Trust.9 9 All advances to K.M.C. were on a demand basis, but
94. Id. at 516-17, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554-55. The court stated that emotional distress arising
from breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be "severe, i.e., substantial or
enduring as distinguished from trivial or transitory." Id. at 517, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 555. The court
determined the plaintiff's emotional distress was short-lived and therefore not severe enough to
rise to a cause of action. Id.
95. Id. at 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554 (stating that the California Supreme Court found it
unnecessary to determine how far the Seaman's doctrine should extend to ordinary commercial
contracts, if at all).
96. Id. The court noted that a client depends on the financial institution's honesty and ex-
pertise to protect his funds. Id. A financial institution stands in a superior bargaining position in
relation to its client. Id. The government regulates financial institutions as heavily as it does the
insurance industry; and a financial institution, like the insurance industry, provides a vital service
affected with public interest. Id.
97. Id.
98. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Recent Development, supra note 1, at 1217-18;
Special Project Note, Lender Liability, supra, at notes 208-21 and accompanying text; Special
Project Note, Written Agreements, infra, at note 104 and accompanying text.
99. Id. at 754. K.M.C. secured its line of credit with its accounts receivable and inventory,
which K.M.C. deposited into a "blocked account" at Irving Trust. Id. at 759. A "blocked account"
is a lender-controlled account that holds accounts receivable receipts derived from the borrower's
904
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Irving Trust had no contractual obligation to advance any funds.100
On March 1, 1982, without notice, Irving Trust refused to advance
K.M.C. 800,000 dollars even though the advance would have left
K.M.C. well within the 3.5 million dollar credit limit,10 1 and despite the
fact that Irving Trust was secured to the full amount of the anticipated
800,000 dollar advance request.102 Irving Trust's refusal to make the ad-
vance forced K.M.C. out of business. 0 3
K.M.C. brought an action against Irving Trust asserting that its
refusal, without prior notice, to make the requested advance was a
breach of its duty of good faith, implied into the loan agreement. 0 4 The
jury awarded K.M.C. 7.5 million dollars, which was affirmed on ap-
peal.10 5 The court rejected Irving Trust's contention that the client was
required to demonstrate dishonesty on the financial institution's part.
Rather, the court held that if a financial institution abused its discre-
tion in exercising the demand provision, this fact alone was sufficient to
establish a breach of the duty of good faith. 06 The court also noted that
good faith required Irving Trust to give notice to K.M.C. before termi-
nation of the line of credit in order to allow K.M.C. to obtain alterna-
tive financing.'0 7 In reaching this conclusion, the court analogized the
operations. The borrower's customers mail their payments directly to the lender, and the lender
then deposits the receipts into the account. As K.M.C.'s receivables were collected, Irving Trust
advanced it additional funds up to the credit limit. Id.
100. Id. Essentially, the arrangement between K.M.C. and Irving Trust was a pattern of Ir-
ving Trust covering of K.M.C.'s overdrafts. The court noted that if K.M.C. could not obtain alter-
native financing, and if Irving Trust refused to advance K.M.C. funds, this would leave K.M.C.
without capital until it could pay off some amount of the line of credit it owed Irving Trust. Id.
Moreover, the court determined that companies similar to K.M.C. (a medium-sized company in
the wholesale grocery business) could not operate without outside financing. Id. Thus, this type of
financing left K.M.C. "entirely at the whim or mercy of Irving, absent an obligation of good faith
performance." Id.
101. Id. at 762.
102. Id. at 762-63.
103. Id. at 754. K.M.C.'s checks bounced as a result of Irving Trust's refusal to advance the
funds it needed. See Hilfinger, K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.: Discretionary Financing and the
Implied Duty of Good Faith, 81 Nw. U.L. REv. 539, 542 (1987) (citing Plaintiff's Complaint at 4-6,
K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (No. CIV-3-82-365)). Moreover,
K.M.C. was unable to obtain alternative financing. Id. These factors led to K.M.C.'s bankruptcy.
Id.
104. K.M.C. Co., 757 F.2d at 754.
105. Id. at 755, 766.
106. Id. at 760-61. Irving Trust stated that in order to determine whether it acted in good
faith, a court should use a subjective test and determine whether it believed there were valid rea-
sons for refusing to advance funds to K.M.C. Id. at 760. The Sixth Circuit, however, opted to
measure Irving Trust's behavior by objective standards-that is, it looked to see "whether a rea-
sonable loan officer in the same situation would have refused to advance funds to K.M.C. without
notice as [was done] on March 1, 1982." Id. at 761. The court determined that Irving Trust acted
unreasonably and thus breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id.
107. Id. at 763.
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case to U.C.C. section 2-309, which requires reasonable notification to
the other party before terminating a contract."0 8
Contrary to the California Supreme Court's holding in Commercial
Cotton, the Sixth Circuit in K.M.C. Co. imposed on the financial insti-
tution the duty to act in good faith and to deal fairly in its transactions
with its client even in the absence of a "special relationship."
B. Other Cases
1. Conduct Relating to Checking Accounts
In several cases, courts have held that a financial institution's ac-
tions with regard to its client's checking accounts had breached the
duty of good faith and fair dealing.10 9 In these situations, the financial
institutions initiated actions on their clients' checking accounts that
created overdraft situations, without first notifying the client.
For example, in First National Bank v. Twombly, 1 0 the Montana
Supreme Court held First National Bank liable for accelerating its cli-
ents' indebtedness. In Twombly, the clients signed a promissory note
calling for a lump sum payment in August 1979."' The clients entered
into a one year lease with the option to buy the restaurant after the
lease's expiration." 2 The lease expired in July 1979, however, and the
Twomblys were faced with the probability of unemployment since they
were not exercising their option to buy the restaurant." 3 Because of the
possibility of unemployment, the Twomblys became concerned about
repaying the note, which was due in one month." 4 Consequently, the
clients entered into a new agreement with First National Bank's loan
officer which converted the lump sum payment arrangement into an in-
108. Id. at 759 (citing U.C.C. § 2-309 (1987)). The court noted that comment 8 to U.C.C. § 2-
309 states that "'[t]he application of principles of good faith and sound commercial practice nor-
mally call for such notification of the termination of a going contract relationship as will give the
other party reasonable time to seek a substitute arrangement.'" Id. (quoting U.C.C. § 2-309 com-
ment 8 (1987)).
109. See, e.g., Tribby v. Northwestern Bank, 217 Mont. 196, 704 P.2d 409 (1985) (holding
that Northwestern Bank's cancellation of a provision allowing its client to write checks in excess of
the balance in his account, without notice, and in retaliation against the client because of an action
brought by him to enforce the terms of an account agreement, amounted to a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing); First Nat'l Bank v. Twombly, 213 Mont. 66, 689 P.2d
1226 (1984) (holding that First National Bank's creation of an overdraft situation in its clients'
account constituted a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); see also
Recent Development, supra note 1, at 1220-22.
110. 213 Mont. 66, 689 P.2d 1226 (1984).
111. Id. at 68, 689 P.2d at 1228.
112. Id.
113. Id. The Twomblys did not exercise their option to buy the restaurant because of failed
negotiations with the owner. Id. Thus, the Twomblys faced the probability of unemployment in




stallment plan.115 Before the transaction was completed, however, the
loan officer was called out of town."' He told the Twomblys that they
could continue the transaction with First National Bank's vice presi-
dent, and that he would inform the vice president concerning the cur-
rent status of the agreement.11 7
When the Twomblys contacted the vice president, he claimed that
he knew nothing about the transaction.11 8 Moreover, he refused to con-
vert the lump sum payment plan into an installment loan arrangement
because the Twomblys currently were unemployed." 9 The vice presi-
dent also determined the loan to be in jeopardy, and accelerated its due
date.120 Finally, he offset the amount of the loan against the amount in
the Twomblys' checking account, but failed to notify them of his ac-
tion. "1 ' As a result of First National Bank's acceleration of the loan and
its offset action, several of the Twomblys' checks were returned for in-
sufficient funds.
122
Citing U.C.C. sections 1-203 and 1-208 as applicable in this situa-
tion, the court stated that when the duty to exercise good faith is im-
posed by law rather than by the contract itself, breach of that duty is
tortious . 2" The court declared that the Twomblys could recover puni-
tive damages if First National Bank's conduct was in reckless disregard
of the Twomblys' rights.12 The court also noted that a jury could have
found that First National Bank acted in a sufficiently culpable manner






120. Id. at 70, 689 P.2d at 1229. The only reason the vice president gave in support of his
insecurity was a phone conversation he had with Mr. Twombly who stated he would not be able to
repay the promissory note in August. Id. at 70, 689 P.2d at 1228-29. The court also noted that the
vice president did not try to find out whether the Twomblys were planning to leave the community
or to establish any other facts to support his finding of insecurity. Id. at 71, 689 P.2d at 1229.
121. Id. at 70, 689 P.2d at 1229.
122. Id. at 71, 689 P.2d at 1229.
123. Id. at 73, 689 P.2d at 1230. Section 1-203 of the U.C.C. imposes on the parties to a
contract the obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1987);
see also supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. Section 1-208 of the U.C.C. states that a party
may "accelerate payment or performance. . . 'at will' or 'when he deems himself insecure'" only if
the party "in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired." U.C.C.
§ 1-208 (1987).
124. Twombly, 213 Mont. at 71, 689 P.2d at 1229.
125. Id. The court noted that under state statutory law, a party could recover punitive dam-
ages if malice, oppression, or fraud were shown. The court defined malice to be:
[w]hen a person knows or has reason to know of facts which create a high degree of risk of
harm to the substantial interests of another, and either deliberately proceeds to act in con-
scious disregard of or indifference to that risk, or recklessly proceeds in unreasonable disre-
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Similarly, in Tribby v. Northwestern Bank12 6 the court held that
Northwestern Bank had violated the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing when, without notice to the client, it cancelled a provision in its
client's checking account that would cover overdrafts.1 27 Northwestern
Bank allegedly took this action in retaliation against the client for
bringing an action to enforce the terms of an account agreement.12 5 The
court cited Twombly in support of its decision to hold Northwestern
Bank liable for punitive damages because of its tortious breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.2"
2. Conduct Relating to Loan Processing
In Jacques v. First National Bank'5 0 the Maryland Supreme Court
found that First National Bank had committed a bad faith breach of
contract by failing to use due care in processing a loan application. First
National Bank agreed to make a loan of 41,400 dollars at 11.875 percent
interest even though the Jacques' had applied for a 112,000 dollar
loan.1"' When the Jacques' discovered that First National Bank only
was committed for 41,400 dollars, they applied with another financial
institution and received a commitment for 110,000 dollars, but at 13.875
gard of or indifference to that risk ....
Id. at 73, 689 P.2d at 1230 (quoting Owens v. Parker Drilling Co., 207 Mont. 446, 451, 676 P.2d
162, 164 (1984)). The court remanded the case for a new trial on punitive damages only, since the
trial court refused to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury. Id. at 71, 689 P.2d at 1229.
126. 217 Mont. 196, 704 P.2d 409 (1985).
127. Id. at 212, 704 P.2d at 419.
128. Id. at 201, 704 P.2d at 412.
129. Id. at 211-12, 704 P.2d at 419. The court expressly stated that it was not holding that
every contract or statutorily imposed obligation, alone, carries an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing which, if breached, would allow for recovery in tort. Id. at 212, 704 P.2d at 419.
The court noted that in this case, however, the circumstances were similar to those in Twombly so
as to justify an instruction to the jury to consider recovery in tort, and more specifically, punitive
damages. Id. at 211-12, 704 P.2d at 419. The court said that the financial institution's conduct, like
the financial institution's conduct in Twombly, might "support a finding of reckless disregard for
Tribby's rights." Id. at 212, 704 P.2d at 419. Moreover, it noted that "the bank stands in the
position of superior bargaining power to its customer that was noted in Twombly; and the evidence
might support a finding that the bank breached an obligation to Tribby." Id.
For cases holding that a bank's actions resulting in an overdraft situation of a client's checking
account did not breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, see Luxonomy Cars, Inc. v.
Citibank 65 A.D.2d 549, 408 N.Y.S.2d 951 (App. Div. 1978) (holding that Citibank's acceleration of
its loan to Luxonomy without notice and its use of Luxonomy's checking account balance to cover
the loan did not amount to a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, even
though Citibank's action caused several of Luxonomy's checks to bounce); and Happy Cattle Feed-
ers, Inc., v. First Nat'l Bank, 618 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (holding that First National
Bank's acceptance of a check from its [the bank's] client that created an overdraft situation on
another client's account, and its subsequent refusal to honor two of Happy Cattle Feeders' checks
drawn from the same account did not breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
130. 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756 (1986).
131. Id. at 529-30, 515 A.2d at 757.
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percent interest. 18 2 Instead of accepting the loan with the higher inter-
est rate, the Jacques' accepted First National Bank's 41,400 dollar loan
and made up the difference with loans from relatives and a 50,000 dol-
lar short-term loan from First National Bank at an annual interest rate
of fifteen percent.138 Consequently, the Jacques sued First National
Bank on claims of malicious interference with contract, gross negli-
gence, and negligence.
1 3 4
As a condition for finding bad faith breach, the court looked for
contractual privity between First National Bank and the loan appli-
cant.13 5 The court found that a contractual relationship arose when
First National Bank agreed to process the loan in consideration for the
payment of an appraisal and credit report fee, and when it further
agreed to give the Jacques a guaranteed interest rate if the loan was
processed, approved, and closed within ninety days of the date of the
application.138
The court noted that the negligent breach of a contract in the ab-
sence of an independent duty or obligation imposed by law is insuffi-
cient to support a tort action. 8 7 The court determined, however, that a
duty separate from those obligations arising from the contract exists
between parties with contractual privity,13 especially when the contract
is formed with a professional possessing a particular skill' 39 or with a
business affected with a public interest. 140 Thus, First National Bank's
failure to use due care in processing the loan application was a bad
faith breach.
Similarly, the court in High v. McLean Financial Corp.'4 1 held that
a "tort duty" existed when McLean Financial failed to advise a loan
applicant that a third-party lender would be reviewing the loan applica-
132. Id. at 530, 515 A.2d at 757. The interest rates had increased since the applicant's initial
loan application with First National.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 531-32, 515 A.2d at 757-58. The trial court found for the Jacques on the negli-
gence claim and awarded them $10,000 consequential damages, but found for First National Bank
on the claims of malicious interference with contract and gross negligence. Id. at 532, 515 A.2d at
758. On appeal, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that First National Bank
"had no duty to use due care in evaluating the Jacques' application for a loan." Id. The Maryland
Court of Appeals granted certiorari to determine whether First National Bank indeed owed a duty
to Jacques to evaluate a loan application with due care. Id. at 532, 515 A.2d at 758.
135. Id. at 534-35, 515 A.2d at 759-60.
136. Id. at 537-38, 515 A.2d at 761.
137. Id. at 534, 515 A.2d at 759 (construing Heckrotte v. Riddle, 224 Md. 591, 595, 168 A.2d
879, 882 (1961)).
138. Id. at 534, 515 A.2d at 759 (citing Slacum v. Eastern Shore Trust Co., 163 Md. 350, 352-
53, 163 A. 119, 120 (1932)).
139. Id. at 541, 515 A.2d at 763.
140. Id. at 542, 515 A.2d at 763.
141. 659 F. Supp. 1561 (D.D.C. 1987).
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tion to decide whether or not to grant the loan. The court determined
that when McLean Financial accepted the processing fee and loan ap-
plication, it "implicitly agreed to process the loan application. ' 142 The
court ascertained that McLean Financial's implied promise to process
the loan application also contained an implied promise to process the
application with reasonable care.143 The court, like the court in Jac-
ques, noted that McLean Financial was a business affected with a pub-
lic interest, and, therefore, it must process the applications that its
clients have paid it to process.4
The Delaware District Court in Hill v. Equitable Bank, N.A.145 fol-
lowed the analysis of the court in Jacques. In Hill the court held the
bank liable for bad faith breach due to the negligent misrepresentations
that it made to a potential client, Hill. 46 As a result of those misrepre-
sentations, Hill suffered an economic loss. As in Jacques, the court
looked for a contract between the two parties. The court determined
that a contract had been formed when Equitable Bank offered to pro-
vide Hill with investment advice and financing in exchange for Hill's
establishment of a banking relationship with Equitable. 147 Because the
court found that a contractual relationship existed, it determined that
Equitable Bank was required to "exercise due care in communicating
facts to plaintiffs.' 14 Thus, Equitable Bank was liable for bad faith
breach because of its misrepresentations to Hill.
3. Emotional Distress
In addition to allowing recovery for punitive damages against fi-
nancial institutions, courts now allow plaintiffs to receive damages for
emotional distress. A classic example is Young v. Bank of America.'49 In
that case, the plaintiff, Young, received damages for emotional distress
in addition to treble damages for Bank of America's wrongful actions.
Young allowed a friend, Wooden, to use her credit card, 50 but Wooden
failed to return it. 151 Young then contacted Bank of America to report
142. Id. at 1570.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 655 F. Supp. 631 (D. Del. 1987), af'd, 851 F.2d 691 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 57
U.S.L.W. 3452 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1989).
146. Id. The financial institution failed to supply Hill with all the information it had regard-
ing certain limited partnerships that Hill was considering investing in, and ultimately did invest
in.
147. Id. at 650. Hill deposited a large amount of money with Equitable, and borrowed funds
as well.
148. Id. at 651.
149. 141 Cal. App. 3d 108, 190 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1983).
150. Id. at 111, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
151. Id. at 111-12, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
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that her credit card had been stolen and to cancel it immediately. 52
Approximately three months later, Bank of America recovered the
credit card, but, in the interim period, over 2000 dollars had been
charged on it.53 Bank of America refused to adjust Young's balance
and billed her for the charges on her card.1
54
In awarding treble damages and damages for emotional distress,
the court relied on several factors. First, the financial institution per-
sistently sought collection of the charges from Young. 5 5 Second, it re-
fused to correct the charges even though it knew that Young's credit
card had been stolen.5 " The financial institution also reported negative
credit information to a credit reporting service, which had adverse con-
sequences on Young. 57 Finally, Young's application for another credit
card was denied because of her bad credit report.158 The court held that
the distress Young suffered from Bank of America's actions was "sub-
stantial and of the requisite severity" to recover damages for emotional
distress.
59
4. A Factually Unsupported Claim
The California Court of Appeals in Kruse v. Bank of America'0
recently overturned a judgment against Bank of America awarded by
the jury in Jewell v. Bank of America.'6' The Court of Appeals deter-
mined that the plaintiffs' claims were unsupported by the evidence. In
Jewell the jury awarded the plaintiff-borrower more than thirty-nine
million dollars.6 2 In that case the widow of James O'Connell had inher-
ited his apple processing company, the O'Connell Company. The
O'Connell Company's apples were supplied by a broker named Jewell.
Three years later, in 1974, Bank of America suddenly denied the
O'Connell Company's request for a capital improvement loan. 16 Subse-
quently, the bank also refused to provide the O'Connell Company with
its customary annual line of credit. 64
152. Id. at 112, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
153. Id.
154. Id.





160. 202 Cal. App. 3d 38, 248 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1988), cert. denied sub nom. Duck v. Bank of
Am., 57 U.S.L.W. 3486 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1989).
161. No. 112439 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Kruse v. Bank of Am., 202
Cal. App 3d 38, 248 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1988).
162. Id. This award was later reduced to $22 million. Id.
163. Kruse, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 45, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
164. Id. Bank of America provided a line of credit to the O'Connell Company to fund the
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Between 1975 and 1980, Jewell loaned over 2.7 million dollars to
the O'Connell Company.16 5 Jewell, in turn, was indebted heavily to
Bank of America, after taking out many short-term loans to assist the
O'Connells and his own financially troubled company. 6 Jewell, how-
ever, believed that Bank of America would combine the loans into a
single long-term loan with a favorable payment schedule because Sulli-
van, the bank officer, told him that "something would be 'worked out'
at the end of the year."' 6 7 But Jewell also knew that Sullivan lacked
authority to approve the consolidated loan arrangement.6 8
In 1980 Bunch, the new branch manager, determined that Jewell
owed too much money.6 9 Subsequently, in September 1980, Bunch in-
formed Jewell that Bank of America would not lend him any more
money.17 0 Consequently, the O'Connell Company was forced to liqui-
date its properties in order to obtain funds to pay off the outstanding
bank loans that Jewell had taken out for its benefit.17 '
When O'Connell's widow filed a fraud action against Jewell and
Bank of America, Jewell and his wife cross-claimed against Bank of
America claiming fraud and bad faith denial of the existence of a con-
tract.7 2 The California Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's find-
ing of fraud by Bank of America because Jewell had failed to prove the
essential element of justifiable reliance.77 The court found that in 1978
and 1979, the Jewells had borrowed over one million dollars in short-
term bank loans, assuming that the bank ultimately would consolidate
the loans into one long-term loan. 74 The court, however, determined
that Jewell could not justifiably rely on this assumption because Jew-
ell's request for long-term financing previously had been denied in
1978. 5 In addition, Jewell knew that Sullivan lacked authority to ap-
prove of a loan of this magnitude. 76 Thus, the court concluded that
company's business operations.
165. Id. at 50, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 48, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
168. Id. at 49, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
169. Id. at 50, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
170. .1d.
171. Id. at 50, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
172. Id. The court stated that essentially, Jewell's complaint was that "the Bank wrongfully
induced [the Jewells] to borrow heavily in order to finance the O'Connell Company; that once the
Jewells were hopelessly overextended, the Bank reneged on its promise to provide long-term fi-
nancing to the O'Connell Company which would have enabled it to repay the JeweUs." Id. at 52,
248 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
173. Id. at 54, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 55, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
176. Id.; see also supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
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Jewell should not have relied on Sullivan's statement made in 1979 that
things would be "worked out. '177
The court also held that Jewell's theory of bad faith denial of a
contract based on Bank of America's failure to supply Jewell with long-
term financing was wholly unsupported by the record. 1 8 The court de-
termined that, at best, the long-term loan was open to negotiation, and
that the parties had not formed a contract.1 79 Citing Seaman's, the
court noted that a tort claim arises when a party breaches a contract
and denies, in bad faith, that the contract exists. An inherent condition
to this tort claim is the existence and breach of an enforceable con-
tract.180 Similarly, the court determined that a tort cause of action
could arise when a party asserts an invalid defense to a breach of con-
tract claim.181 In any event, however, there must be a valid contract.
The court dismissed Jewell's cross-appeals because no contract existed
between Jewell and Bank of America.1 82
IV. USING ARTICLE 2 OF THE U.C.C. AS A GOOD FAITH METHOD FOR
DEMANDING ASSURANCES WHEN INSECURE
In a recent case, K.M.C. Co.,183 the court used Article 2 of the
U.C.C. by analogy to imply good faith action with regard to discontinu-
ing a line of credit. By analogy, a financial institution could use U.C.C.
sections 2-609 and 2-610 when insecure, for example, about loan repay-
ment or a client's solvency."8 If the U.C.C. guidelines are followed, a
177. Kruse, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 55, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27.
178. Id. at 57, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
179. Id. at 59, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 229-30. The court noted that Jewell was told that Sullivan
was attempting to obtain his superior's approval for the loan. Id. at 59, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 229.
Moreover, the court determined that there was no manifestation of assent to contract by Bank of
America, and, therefore, no agreement was found. Id.
180. Id. at 57, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 228; see also supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
181. Kruse, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 58, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
182. Id. at 68, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 235. The court also determined that the widow, Mrs. Kruse,
had failed to establish that Bank of America was responsible for the bankruptcy of the O'Connell
Company. Id.
183. See supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text.
184. Section 2-609(1) of the U.C.C. states that "[w]hen reasonable grounds for insecurity
arise with respect to performance of either party the other in writing may demand adequate assur-
ance of due performance and until he receives such assurance may if commercially reasonable
suspend any performance for which he has not already received the agreed return." U.C.C. § 2-
609(1) (1987). Section 2-609(2) of the U.C.C. states that "the reasonableness of grounds for insecu-
rity and the adequacy of any assurance offered shall be determined according to commercial stan-
dards." Id. § 2-609(2). Section 2-609(4) of the U.C.C. states that if thirty days pass after a party
makes a written demand for assurance and no assurance has been received, the contract is repudi-
ated. Id. § 2-609(4). Section 2-610 of the U.C.C. states that if a party repudiates the contract:
the loss of which will substantially impair the value of the contract to the other, the aggrieved
party may
(a) for a commercially reasonable time await performance
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court may not question the financial institution's good faith conduct in
accelerating a loan, demanding payment, or discontinuing a line of
credit.
For example, if a financial institution fears that a client, because of
future insolvency, will become unable to repay a loan, under U.C.C. sec-
tion 2-609(1), the financial institution could demand assurances for ade-
quate performance."8" Reasonable grounds could exist if, for example, a
financial institution fears that a loan will not be repaid because of a
client's impending insolvency. 18 In determining what constitutes a rea-
sonable time for receiving assurances, U.C.C. section 2-609(4) states
that any assurance received within thirty days is reasonable.187 Section
2-609(2) of the U.C.C. declares that the adequacy of assurance is "de-
termined according to commercial standards."' 88 If the financial institu-
tion does not receive assurance within thirty days, or, in the alternative,
receives assurance within thirty days but that assurance is not adequate
according to commercial standards, the contract is repudiated."8 9
Contract repudiation and its remedies are covered under U.C.C.
section 2-610. Under that section, an aggrieved party only may deter-
mine the contract to be in repudiation if the lack of performance would
"substantially impair the value of the contract to the [aggrieved
party]."'90 Arguably, a party's inability to repay a loan because of im-
pending insolvency would "substantially impair" the financial institu-
tion's value of the contract. Thus, by analogy, a financial institution
could either await performance for a commercially reasonable time' 91 or
resort to any remedy available for breach.
19 2
If a financial institution utilized these measures before accelerating
a loan, demanding payment, or discontinuing a line of credit, a court
may find it difficult to determine that the financial institution acted in
bad faith.
by the repudiating party; or
(b) resort to any remedy for breach . . . and
(c) in either case suspend his own performance.
Id. § 2-610.
185. Id. § 2-609(1); see supra note 184 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-609(1) (1987)).
186. See, e.g., Rigby Corp. v Boatmen's Bank & Trust Co., 713 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986) (holding that Boatmen's Bank & Trust acted reasonably when it called Rigby's loan due and
when it applied deposits it already had against the loan when it found that Rigby was insolvent).
187. U.C.C. § 2-609(4) (1987); see supra note 184 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-609(4) (1987)).
188. U.C.C. § 2-609(2) (1987); see supra note 184 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-609(2) (1987)).
189. See U.C.C. § 2-609 comment 5 (1987).
190. U.C.C. § 2-610 (1987); see supra note 184 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-610 (1987)).
191. U.C.C. § 2-610(a) (1987); see supra note 184 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-610 (1987)).
192. U.C.C. § 2-610(b) (1987); see supra note 184 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-610 (1987)).
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V. CONCLUSION
Lender liability is a developing area of law. The U.C.C. duties of
good faith have helped to expand the field of lender liability. Since the
introduction of bad faith breach into banking is relatively new, its scope
has not been defined clearly. Courts have been inconsistent in their ap-
plication of bad faith breach against financial institutions.193 While sev-
eral courts expressly acknowledge this cause of action, other courts do
not recognize bad faith breach. In addition, some courts only will allow
a cause of action for bad faith breach if the elements of the "special
relationship" typically found in insurance contracts are present in the
banking relationship. 94 Regardless, financial institutions can be sure
that plaintiffs will continue to try new ways to include a tort action
against them when suing for breach of contract. With this in mind, a
193. Since lender liability cases are very fact specific, it is difficult to make any generaliza-
tions about what sort of conduct could lead a financial institution into trouble. One must be aware,
however, that the recent trend for courts is to find liability under breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing where once there would have been none. With this in mind, listed
below are several do's and don't's that a financial institution should bear in mind:
1. Give a client reasonable advance notice before accelerating a loan or discontinuing a line of
credit so the client has an opportunity to find alternative financing. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co., 757 F.2d
752; see also supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text.
2. Give a client adequate written notice before taking any discretionary action against the client's
accounts. See, e.g., Twombly, 213 Mont. 66, 689 P.2d 1226; see also supra notes 110-25 and accom-
panying text.
3. Make sure the client knows the financial institution's intentions of whether it plans on stopping
or continuing a line of credit. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co., 757 F.2d 752; see also supra notes 98-108 and
accompanying text.
4. Never use as a defense to an impending breach of contract that a contract does not exist unless
the financial institution is certain that this defense has merit. Additionally, and more generally, a
financial institution should never justify its actions with a defense it knows lacks merit in order to
induce the client not to litigate his claim. See, e.g., Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206
Cal. Rptr. 354; see also supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text. For further support, see Com-
mercial Cotton, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, and supra notes 91-97 and accompanying
text.
5. A financial institution should not threaten the client with default in order to induce the client to
follow its advice. See, e.g., State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984) (holding State National Bank liable for fraud in threatening to call Farah's loan if it made a
company managing change that State National Bank did not like).
6. Realize that a client expects the financial institution who accepts his loan application to process
it. If another financial institution will do the processing and will determine whether or not to grant
the loan, the client should be told. See, e.g., High v. McLean Fin. Corp., 659 F. Supp 1561 (D.D.C.
1987); see also supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
7. When offering a client investment advice, do not make misrepresentations to a client or with-
hold information that the financial institution knows will affect a client's decision. See, e.g., Hill,
655 F. Supp. 631; see also supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
8. Act promptly on a client's request to cancel his credit card. See, e.g., Young, 141 Cal. App. 3d
108, 190 Cal. Rptr. 122; see also supra notes 149-59 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354; see also supra
notes 71-85 and accompanying text. For further support, see Commercial Cotton, 163 Cal. App. 3d
155, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, and supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
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financial institution must conduct itself carefully in dealing with its cli-
ents or risk the imposition of a large judgment against it.
Susan D. Gresham
